



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

with a statute requiring every ship to accept a pilot's services. *The Carrie L. Tyler*, 106 Fed. 422. It is to be hoped that the doctrine of the second circuit, adopted by the principal case, will ultimately prevail. A doctrine of imputed negligence is as much out of place in admiralty as it is in the common law.

ANIMALS — DAMAGE TO PERSONS AND CHATTELS BY ANIMALS — HORSE STRAYING ON THE HIGHWAY. — The plaintiff's automobile was damaged in a collision with the defendant's horse which was at large in the highway adjoining the defendant's land. The defendant owned to the center of the road. It was not shown that the defendant knowingly permitted his horse to be there, or that he had knowledge of any quality in the horse that would make such a collision especially probable. The lower court granted a nonsuit. *Held*, that this was not error. *Dyer v. Mudgett*, 107 Atl. 831 (Me.).

Where a local statute or ordinance forbids the presence of stray animals in the highway, the case would turn on whether the statute was intended merely to prevent trespasses, or to protect travelers as well. *Marsh v. Koons*, 78 Ohio St. 68, 84 N. E. 599. *Cf. Decker v. McSorley*, 111 Wis. 91, 86 N. W. 554. In the absence of such statutes, some jurisdictions hold that it is not wrongful for the animal to be on the highway, and thus reach the result of the principal case. *Holden v. Shattuck*, 34 Vt. 336; *Brady v. Straub*, 177 Ky. 468, 197 S. W. 938; *Higgins v. Searle*, 25 T. L. R. 301. But in other states the contrary view is held. *Leonard v. Doherty*, 174 Mass. 565, 55 N. E. 461; *Barnes v. Chapin*, 4 All. (Mass.) 444; *Baldwin v. Ensign*, 49 Conn. 113. It would seem possible to subject an animal straying in the highway to the same rules as an animal trespassing on private land. See 32 HARV. L. REV. 420. But since the courts do not proceed on this theory the defendant's ownership of part or all of the highway becomes immaterial. In other cases the courts have not considered the presence of the animal in the highway, and have excused the owner from liability on the basis of the unforeseeable nature of the accident. *Earl v. Van Alstine*, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 630; *Maloney v. Bishop & Bridges*, 105 N. W. 407 (Iowa); *Heath's Garage v. Hodges*, 32 T. L. R. 134. It is to be noted that the doctrine of scienter does not properly belong in these cases. *Scienter* has to do with the probability of an animal acting contrary to the normal nature of his kind; whereas in these cases it is a question of the probability of any animal of a certain kind acting in the way that the defendant's animal actually did. See *Klenberg v. Russell*, 125 Ind. 531, 25 N. E. 596; *Earl v. Van Alstine*, *supra*.

BANKRUPTCY — DISCHARGE — BURDEN OF PROOF IN ATTACKING DISCHARGE. — The defendant had sold an automobile to the plaintiff, making certain express representations concerning it, and agreeing that if it did not fulfill these representations he would refund the money. The plaintiff had returned it, and upon refusal by the defendant to refund the money had obtained a judgment for the same, the jury finding the above facts to be true. The defendant then became bankrupt and the plaintiff proved the judgment and received dividends. Having received his discharge in bankruptcy, the defendant now sought to have the judgment discharged. The plaintiff opposed on the ground that it had been based on a liability for obtaining property by false pretenses and hence was not discharged under Section 17a (2) of the Bankruptcy Act. *Held*, that the judgment be discharged. *Guindon v. Brusky*, 43 Am. B. R. 263 (Minn.).

A discharge in bankruptcy releases the bankrupt from all provable debts except those specified in Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act. *Bluthenthal v. Jones*, 208 U. S. 64. The discharge does not automatically relieve the bankrupt, however, and its effect upon a particular debt is to be determined by the court in which an action thereon arises. *In re Weisberg*, 253 Fed. 833; *In re Lockwood*, 240 Fed. 161. The burden of establishing is on the creditor, who